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Anxiety and fear are often confounded in discussions of human emotions. However, studies of rodent
defensive reactions under naturalistic conditions suggest anxiety is functionally distinct from fear.
Unambiguous threats, such as predators, elicit flight from rodents (if an escape-route is available),
whereas ambiguous threats (e.g., the odor of a predator) elicit risk assessment behavior, which is
associated with anxiety as it is preferentially modulated by anti-anxiety drugs. However, without human
evidence, it would be premature to assume that rodent-based psychological models are valid for humans.
We tested the human validity of the risk assessment explanation for anxiety by presenting 8 volunteers
with emotive scenarios and asking them to pose facial expressions. Photographs and videos of these
expressions were shown to 40 participants who matched them to the scenarios and labeled each
expression. Scenarios describing ambiguous threats were preferentially matched to the facial expression
posed in response to the same scenario type. This expression consisted of two plausible environmental-
scanning behaviors (eye darts and head swivels) and was labeled as anxiety, not fear. The facial
expression elicited by unambiguous threat scenarios was labeled as fear. The emotion labels generated
were then presented to another 18 participants who matched them back to photographs of the facial
expressions. This back-matching of labels to faces also linked anxiety to the environmental-scanning face
rather than fear face. Results therefore suggest that anxiety produces a distinct facial expression and that
it has adaptive value in situations that are ambiguously threatening, supporting a functional, risk-
assessing explanation for human anxiety.
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The conserved status of flight behavior in vertebrate species
(Edmunds, 1974) attests to its evolutionary value as a response to
threat, but flight is not adaptive in all threatening contexts. For
example, flight from a novel object, whose threat status is ambig-
uous, could lead to unnecessary expenditure of energy and might
preclude discovery of new and valuable resources. Flight may also
be maladaptive when a serious threat appears to be in the vicinity
but its precise location is unclear, such as when the odor of a
predator is detected. In this context, flight is as likely to lead to
danger as to safety. For these reasons, flight behavior is typically
reserved for use against clear threats when an escape route is
available (R. J. Blanchard, Blanchard, & Hori, 1989), whereas
ambiguous or potential threats elicit vigilance reactions, compris-
ing the inhibition of ongoing behavior and heightened information
gathering (D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 2008). Studies of innate
rodent defensive responses, under naturalistic but controlled
(ethoexperimental) conditions, have demonstrated the adaptive
value of vigilance as a counter to ambiguous threats (Pinel &
Mana, 1989) and suggest that one of its most important prepro-
grammed components is risk assessment, characterized chiefly by
sniffing, cautious approach, and environmental scanning (marked
by side-to-side head sweeps; D. C. Blanchard, Griebel, &
Blanchard, 2003).
Anxiety has been proposed as the emotional component of risk
assessment behavior in contrast to fear or panic, which is viewed
as the emotional accompaniment of flight (D. C. Blanchard &
Blanchard, 2008; D. C. Blanchard, Blanchard, & Rodgers, 1991).
This functional separation of anxiety and fear is based on the
observation that drugs with clinical effectiveness against general-
ized anxiety disorder preferentially modulate risk assessment be-
havior in rodents without systematically altering flight responses
(D. C. Blanchard, Blanchard, Tom, & Rodgers, 1990; R. J.
Blanchard, Griebel, Henrie, & Blanchard, 1997), whereas anti-
panic medicines preferentially modulate flight (Griebel,
Blanchard, Agnes, & Blanchard, 1995). However, although this
suggestion concerning anxiety as the specific emotional accompa-
niment of risk assessment might inform theoretical models of
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emotion, its dependence on evidence from rodent research means
the risk assessment explanation for anxiety requires experimental
validation in humans (Panksepp, 1998) so that its pan-specific
generality can be assessed: this was our overall aim in this article.
Existing Research on Separability of Anxiety and
Fear in Humans
Despite the considerable debate and even confusion among
psychologists concerning the separability of anxiety and fear
(Geer, 1965), evidence from several parts of the psychological
literature suggests that they can be differentiated and, especially,
have different functional properties. For example, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., [DSM–IV];
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) distinguishes on a tem-
poral basis between psychological illness characterized by recur-
rent discrete periods of intense fear (labeled as panic disorder) and
illness in which the chief symptom is prolonged episodes of
anxiety or worry (labeled as generalized anxiety disorder). Addi-
tionally, although both are classed in the DSM–IV as anxiety
disorders, the different pharmacological responses of panic disor-
der and generalized anxiety disorder (e.g., Gould, Otto, Pollack, &
Yap, 1997; Wade, Lepola, Koponen, Pedersen, & Pedersen, 1997)
support the notion that they are distinct illnesses. This analysis
suggests that anxiety and fear may be separable emotions.
In the field of individual differences research, the existence of
questionnaires that putatively measure proneness to anxiety (e.g.,
State–Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene,
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and questionnaires that putatively measure
proneness to fear (e.g., Fear Survey Schedule; Wolpe, & Lang,
1977) implies that anxiety and fear are psychometrically separable.
This implication is supported by the typically modest correlations
reported between scores on fear questionnaires and scores on
questionnaire measures of trait anxiety (e.g., r  .38; Hagopian &
Ollendick, 1996), and when such correlations are statistically
tested for their differences, scores on questionnaire measures of
anxiety/neuroticism and fear turn out to be dissociable (Perkins,
Kemp & Corr, 2007). However, this evidence must be tempered by
the knowledge that personality questionnaires typically are limited
by the fact that it is difficult to determine whether they measure the
named construct, other than by the circular process of correlating
their scores with those of other, similarly named questionnaire
measures. Taken together, issues of this type mean that research
questions such as those concerning anxiety and fear separability
are unlikely to be answered by wholly psychometric means (Corr
& Perkins, 2006).
Perhaps with these limitations in mind, attempts have been made
to conduct psychophysiological tests of anxiety and fear separa-
bility that do not require the use of personality questionnaires. For
example, investigations concerning the effects of psychological
states upon perceptions of pain suggest that anxiety and fear have
opposite effects on pain reactivity: threat of electric shocks (a
putative anxiety condition) increases pain reactivity, whereas ac-
tual exposure to electric shocks (a putative fear condition) reduces
sensitivity to a subsequent radiant heat pain stimulus (Rhudy &
Meagher, 2000). Purely human-based studies of this type, how-
ever, are limited by their reliance on implicit acceptance of dis-
tinctions between the types of situations that human participants
find to be anxiety-inducing and those that are putatively fear-
inducing. Therefore, without an objective measure of what consti-
tutes an anxiety-inducing or fear-inducing situation it is difficult to
have confidence in the results of such emotion-induction studies as
demonstrating that anxiety is a distinct emotion, separate from
fear.
Experimental Methods for Studying Defensively
Related Emotions in Humans
The discrete functional, defensive associations for anxiety and
fear indicated by drug studies of rodent defense (D. C. Blanchard
& Blanchard, 2008) suggest that they may be studied as separable
emotional phenomena by exposing human participants to different
types of threatening situations. This approach has obvious practical
and ethical drawbacks, but studies using computer-generated sim-
ulations of defensive situations have provided some tentative sup-
port for the risk assessment explanation of anxiety in humans. For
example, Mobbs et al. (2007, 2009) in functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) studies used a maze paradigm in which a
pursuing predator had the capacity to inflict harmless but unpleas-
ant electric shocks; they demonstrated that distant threats activated
prefrontal cortical areas, whereas close or imminently dangerous
threats increased activity in the midbrain. As distant threats will,
on average, be perceived by participants as more ambiguous than
close threats and forebrain areas appear to have an important role
in the mediation of anxiety (Mindus, Rasmussen, & Lindquist,
1994), these data could be interpreted post hoc as providing
support for an association between anxiety and threat ambiguity in
humans.
Other evidence comes from analysis of behavioral effects of
pharmaceutical compounds on human defensive reactions. Perkins
et al. (2009) showed that 1 mg of the clinically effective anxiety-
reducing drug lorazepam decreased the intensity of forwards/
backwards oscillation in healthy adult men when they were
trapped by two threat stimuli in a computerized simulation of a
runway-based avoidance task. Forwards/backwards oscillation
during entrapment in a closed runway is part of the rodent risk
assessment repertoire (Griebel, Blanchard, Jung, & Blanchard,
1995); however, in the human translation of the runway paradigm,
this behavioral analogue had the flaw that, unlike the rodent
equivalent, it did not increase the information-gathering capacity
of the participants, preventing conclusive demonstration of a func-
tional association between risk assessment and anxiety in humans
(D. C. Blanchard, Griebel, Pobbe, & Blanchard, 2011).
Facial Expressions of Emotion as an
Experimental Tool
Facial expressions of emotion have attracted scientific attention
for centuries. Notably, Darwin (1872) viewed them as evolved
phenomena, whereas many researchers in the early-to-mid twen-
tieth century (e.g., Mead, 1928) viewed such expressions as cul-
turally determined. Modern psychologists have, however, returned
to the Darwinian view that facial expressions of emotion are
essentially innate. This conclusion is based on studies showing that
facial expressions of emotions generalize across cultures (e.g.,
Ekman & Friesen, 1971).
The readily observed nature of facial expressions of emotion
and their innate, evolved origins has led them to be perceived in
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modern times as a powerful tool for studying emotion (e.g., C.
Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Mennitt, & Harmon-Jones, 2011). In
the present research, we followed this strategy, adapting an actor–
observer paradigm originally developed for research on the cross-
cultural validity of facial expressions of emotion (Ekman, 1972) to
make a first attempt at testing for a tripartite association in humans
among anxiety, ambiguous threat, and human risk assessment
behavior in a naturalistic form that plausibly has an information-
gathering function.
In Experiment 1, we sought to investigate the functional signif-
icance of risk assessment behavior in humans, predicting that a
human facial expression portraying environmental-scanning be-
havior would be preferentially matched to scenarios describing
ambiguous threat. In Experiment 2, we then attempted to deter-
mine the social significance of risk assessment in humans, pre-
dicting that the putative facial expression for environmental scan-
ning would be preferentially labeled by hypothesis-naı¨ve observers
as representing anxiety and not fear or any other major emotion.
Experiment 1: The Functional Significance of Risk
Assessment in Humans
Method
Participants. Forty participants (20 men and 20 women)
between the ages of 18 and 58 years (M 22.95; SD 6.52) were
recruited by means of e-mail and paper advertisements on the
campus of Swansea University in the United Kingdom. They
included undergraduates, postgraduates, mature students, and
members of the staff. All participants provided informed consent,
and the study was approved by the Swansea University Psychol-
ogy Department Ethics Committee.
Stimuli. Twenty-four brief emotive scenarios and nine facial
images were created for this experiment (see the Appendix and
Figure 1, respectively). The emotive scenarios were written fol-
lowing the format of the Blanchard Threat Scenario Questionnaire
(D. C. Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001),
describing situations that plausibly contain ambiguous threat and
situations containing clear threat. Scenarios were also included
that, at face value, were likely to elicit the emotions of happiness,
sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, and interest/excitement. These
latter emotions were not central to our research aim; however,
scenarios representing them were necessary so that we could
assess the observers’ capacity to dissociate a putatively anxiety-
related environmental-scanning facial expression from other im-
portant human facial expressions of emotion. Interest/excitement is
not always listed as a basic facial expression of emotion but was
included here because of the possibility that an environmental-
scanning expression might be confused with the expectant facial
expression that has been described in individuals who are inter-
ested or excited (Tomkins & McCarter, 1964). In order to deter-
mine whether a facial expression purporting to show a particular
Figure 1. Facial expressions posed in response to emotive scenarios. Images 1 and 6 were posed in response
to scenarios describing ambiguous threat and clear threat, respectively. Image 3 was intended to be an
expressionless control stimulus. The remaining images were posed in response to scenarios intended to convey
happiness (Image 2), interest (Image 4), surprise (Image 5), anger (Image 7), sadness, (Image 8), and disgust
(Image 9).
912 PERKINS, INCHLEY-MORT, PICKERING, CORR, AND BURGESS
emotion was matched reliably across different situations purport-
ing to elicit the same emotion, we designed the experiment so that
the number of scenarios exceeded the number of facial images.
Furthermore, as a safeguard against participants using a process of
elimination to match facial images to scenarios, putative emotions
were not represented equally among the scenarios: happiness, fear,
anger, and anxiety were featured in four scenarios each, and the
remaining emotions were featured in two scenarios each. Partici-
pants were not told of these differing frequencies of each putative
emotion among the scenarios.
In order to create the facial expression images, eight volunteers
who were not part of the participant cohort and were unaware of
the experimental hypotheses each posed a facial expression of
emotion while being videorecorded on a webcam run via Windows
XP (Microsoft Corp.; Redmond, WA). In an attempt to maximize
the naturalism of the posed facial expression images, we read each
volunteer a scenario that contained the target emotional content
and asked him or her briefly to imagine being in that scenario and
then immediately pose whichever facial expression he or she
would deploy if the scenario was real. Eight video clips, each 5 s
in duration, were generated by this process, and a single still frame
was captured from each of the video clips. We used both still and
video clips in this experiment to test whether mode of facial image
representation affected recognition.
Twenty four 3  3 matrices were compiled using Adobe Pre-
miere software (Adobe Systems, San Jose, CA), with Matrices
1–12 being composed of still images and Matrices 13–24 of video
clips (looped so that they would play repeatedly). The images were
ordered in this way so that participants would start the task with
the less informative image format (stills; see Figure 1) and then
progress to the more informative image type (video, which can be
downloaded at https://sites.google.com/site/adamperkinsphd), al-
lowing a test of whether participants’ ability to match facial
images to scenarios was boosted by the availability of video
material. The matrix location of each face was shuffled pseudo-
randomly in order to increase unpredictability (i.e., no face fea-
tured in the same position on two consecutive matrices). Image 3
in Figure 1 was not intended to portray an emotion and was
included as a neutral control face. The 24 facial image matrices
were then inserted into a computerized slide show that displayed
an emotive scenario and 3  3 matrix of facial expression images
on each slide. Two versions of this slide show were created so that
the order in which the scenarios were presented was counterbal-
anced. Thus, Slides 1–12 of Slideshow A displayed Scenarios
1–12 accompanied by Matrices 1–12 and Slides 13–24 of Version
A showed Scenarios 13–24 accompanied by Matrices 13–24. In
Slideshow B, scenario order was reversed so that Matrices 1–12
were accompanied by Scenarios 24–13 and Matrices 13–24 by
Scenarios 12–1.
Procedure. Participants were seated alone in front of a com-
puter monitor displaying the slideshow (they were randomly allo-
cated to Version A or B), and as each slide was displayed, they
read the scenario and selected whichever facial expression they
judged to match it most closely. If they judged that none of the
facial expressions matched the scenario, they were permitted to
indicate no match. They then wrote down on their answer sheet a
label for the facial expression of emotion shown on the face they
had just selected. Participants controlled the transition from slide
to slide and were allowed to take as much time as they wanted on
each slide.
Statistical analysis. Repeated-measures analyses of variance
(RM ANOVAs) with planned pairwise contrasts were used to
compare face-scenario matching success rates across scenario
type. Owing to concerns about whether the data satisfied the
assumptions underlying ANOVAs, we verified the probability
values using nonparametric resampling methods (permutation
tests).
Results
Visual analysis of movements displayed in the anxiety face
versus fear face. The video of the putative fear face displayed
no movements that could be construed as facilitating environmen-
tal scanning: throughout the 5-s clip, the eyes are fixed on the
camera and the plane of the face does not change. The video of the
putative anxiety face displayed three distinct scanning movements
of the eyes; viewed from the perspective of the observer, the eyes
dart from low left to high left to the center right of the screen.
Simultaneously, the head swivels from left to right approximately
30°. The darting eyes in the putative facial expression for anxiety
are consistent with the notion that such a facial expression may
facilitate environmental scanning, as they allow the eyes to cover
a wider sector of the vicinity than a fixed-gaze facial expression
such as the putative facial expression for fear. The head swivel
seen in the video should further boost the effectiveness of the eye
darts while also aiding stereophonic localization of sounds. These
movements together could plausibly be interpreted as resembling
rodent environmental-scanning behavior that serves to allow max-
imum scanning ability with minimal physical movement to aid
concealment.
Matching of scenarios to facial images. We found facial
expression images were correctly matched in 89% of emotive
scenario presentations, and, within each of the eight scenario types,
the facial image most frequently matched was that which had been
generated by the eight actor–volunteers in response to that type of
scenario (Figure 2). A facial image intended to be expressionless
(Image 3, Figure 1) was matched to an emotive scenario in less
than 1% of scenario presentations, and “no match” was declared in
only one of the 960 scenario presentations. A RM ANOVA (with
a single factor of scenario type) revealed there were significant
differences in the degree to which scenarios were matched to their
putative facial expression, F(7, 273)  3.08, p  .004; permuta-
tion test p  .003. We used planned pairwise contrasts to compare
the success rate for matching the putative environmental-scanning
face (Image 1, Figure 1) to the ambiguous threat scenarios with the
rates of success at matching expected facial images to the other
seven scenario types. The scenarios intended to convey happiness
were associated with a higher rate of successful matching to their
expected facial expression than the scenarios describing ambigu-
ous threat (99% vs. 90%), F(1, 39)  9.06, p  .005; no other
pairwise contrasts versus the ambiguous threat scenarios ap-
proached significance, all Fs  2.91, ps  0.09.
The observed pattern was not affected by adding the gender of
the participant or the version of the slideshow the participant
judged as a between-subjects factor in the analyses; the Scenario
Type  Gender interaction and Scenario Type  Version inter-
action did not approach significance, F(7, 266)  0.76, p  .62,
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and F(7, 266) 0.55 p .79, respectively. The data were rescored
to give separate matching success rates for still and video face
displays. A two-way RM ANOVA (Format  Scenario Type)
showed that the main effect of format (video vs. still) was not
significant, F(1, 38) 0.35, p .56, and Format Scenario Type
interaction was also nonsignificant, F(7, 266)  1.35, p  .23.
These results remained substantially unchanged when the analyses
were restricted just to the four scenarios (ambiguous threat, clear
threat, happy, and sad) for which four exemplars were used: the
scenario main effect was still significant, F(3, 117)  7.9, p 
.001], and both effects involving format did not approach signif-
icance, both Fs  1.7, ps  .20.
Discussion
Viewed as a whole, results of Experiment 1 support our predic-
tion concerning an association between risk assessment behavior
and ambiguous threat. Since rodents also show an association
between risk assessment behavior and ambiguous threat and our
participants were not told of the hypothesis being tested in this
study, these results can be viewed as providing tentative yet
credible evidence for the pan-specific validity of risk assessment
as a functional and conserved response to ambiguous threat. Ad-
ditionally, the general ease with which participants were able to
match emotive scenarios to appropriate facial expressions provides
further support for the value of the actor–observer paradigm as a
tool for probing the emotional life of humans.
Experiment 2: The Social Significance of Risk
Assessment in Humans
Having found in Experiment 1 that in humans, as in rodents,
environmental-scanning behavior is specifically associated with
ambiguously threatening situations, we now sought to determine
its social significance in humans. That is, does environmental-
scanning behavior specifically signal anxiety to observers and not
fear or any other plausible major emotion? Additionally, in Ex-
periment 2 we sought to determine whether participants who had
not been exposed to the source material (i.e., emotive scenarios)
used to generate the facial expressions of emotion in Experiment 1
could nevertheless match appropriate emotion labels to the facial
images. This step was necessary to allay the concern that the text
of the scenarios had acted as a prompt when the participants in
Experiment 1 were deciding which emotion labels to apply to
which facial images.
In Experiment 1, we had asked each of the 40 participants to
generate a label to describe each facial expression that they
matched to a scenario (Table 1). In Experiment 2 we asked human
participants who had not participated in the previous experiment
and who were unaware of our hypotheses to attempt to match
facial expression labels generated by the participants in Experi-
ment 1 back to the images of facial expressions that were used in
Experiment 1. We predicted in this second experiment that the
facial expression displaying environmental scanning would be
labeled significantly more frequently with the word anxiety or its
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) synonyms (worry, concern,
unease, nervousness) than the word fear or its OED synonyms
(panic, fright, horror, terror). To obtain a double dissociation in
facial labeling, we also predicted that our putative facial expres-
sion for fear (Image 6, Figure 1) would be labeled significantly
more frequently with the word fear or its OED synonyms than with
the word anxiety or its OED synonyms.
Method
Participants. Eighteen participants (seven men and 11
women) between the ages of 22 and 71 years (M  33.22; SD 
13.34) were recruited by means of e-mail and paper advertisements
on the campus of Swansea University in the United Kingdom.
They included undergraduates, postgraduates, mature students and
Figure 2. Bar chart showing matches between facial expression images and types of emotive scenarios. Error
bars indicate a within-subjects confidence interval computed as described by Masson and Loftus (2003) and
calculated using the mean square error from the one-way within-subjects analysis of variance.
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members of the staff. All participants provided informed consent,
and the study was approved by the Swansea University Psychol-
ogy Department Ethics Committee.
Stimuli. The nine facial expressions shown in Figure 1 were
each printed onto a separate sheet of A4 (210  297 mm; 8.3 
11.7 in.) paper along with an extra page that had “NO MATCH”
written on it. Each page was labeled with a number as in Figure 1
with the no-match page marked as Number 10. The 40 observers
in Experiment 1 had generated an emotion label for each of the 24
scenario/facial expression pairings, giving a theoretical total of 960
emotion labels. However, a considerable amount of label duplica-
tion occurred between participants (additionally 37 labels were
illegible and were discarded). When duplicate labels and different
versions of the same word (e.g., anxiety–anxious–anxiousness)
were combined, 64 unique emotion labels remained. Table 1
shows these 64 emotion labels and their pattern of generation in
relation to the facial images presented.
Procedure. All nine photographs plus the no-match sheet
were laid out on a table in front of the participant. The experi-
menter read each of the 64 unique emotion labels generated during
Experiment 1 to the participant who indicated the number of the
image that he or she judged to match it (or said “No match”). Each
label and number pair was written down by the experimenter.
Results and Statistical Analyses
We concentrated on the 10 verbal labels that are OED synonyms
of anxiety and fear (five labels for each). Matches of these emotion
labels to facial images in Experiment 2 were as shown in Table 2.
The matching was consistent with our predictions and thus fits the
risk assessment explanation for anxiety. The label anxiety was
matched by 78% (14/18) of participants to the facial image dis-
playing environmental scanning (i.e., the putative facial expression
for anxiety), and a similar number of matches were obtained for
the four OED synonyms of anxiety. Neither the label fear nor any
of its four OED synonyms was matched to this environmental-
scanning face by any of the participants. Conversely, the label fear
was matched by 72% (13/18) of participants to the putative facial
expression for fear, and its four OED synonyms were matched
with the fear face at an even higher rate (i.e., by 16 or 17 of the 18
participants). While the label anxiety was matched to the fear face
only rarely (by 22% of the participants), none of the four OED
synonyms of anxiety was ever matched to the fear face.
To test this predicted double dissociation of label–face matching
statistically, we began by coding the chosen faces for each of the
10 labels in Table 2 as 1 or 0; this coding was based on whether
the chosen face was matched (1) or was not matched (0) to the
anxiety face. We then performed a Cochran’s Q repeated-measures
test for binary data (Conover, 1999) across the 10 verbal labels and
found clear statistical evidence (Q 101.2; df 9; p .0001) for
concluding that the verbal labels are not all equivalent in terms of
matching to the anxiety face. This reflects the fact that the five
anxiety labels all have high match frequencies (11/18 participants
or more), and the five fear labels all have low match frequencies
(all 0/18). However, when we repeated this analysis but restricted
it to the five anxiety labels only, there was no significant diver-
gence of matching across the five anxiety labels (11/18 to 14/18;
Q  2.1, df  4, p  .7).
We then recoded the same data on the basis of matches to the
fear face. Once again, testing with Cochran’s Q across all 10 labels
provided strong statistical evidence for rejecting the hypothesis
that all the 10 labels are matched to the fear face in the same way
(Q  125.9; df  9; p  .0001). When we restricted the analysis
just to the five fear labels, we obtained evidence of significant
variation in matching frequency across the labels (Q  10.8, df 
4, p .03). This occurs because the fear label itself is not matched
as often to the fear face (13/18 times) as are the four other labels
(each matched by 16/18 participants or more). Finally, we looked
at the fear face matching frequencies for the five anxiety labels;
Table 2
Matches of Anxiety- and Fear-Related Emotion Labels to Facial Expression Images in
Experiment 2
Emotion
labels
Environmental
scanning Fear face Other faces No match
1. Anxiety 14/18 4/18 0/18 0/18
2. Worry 14/18 0/18 4/18 0/18
3. Concern 13/18 0/18 2/18 3/18
4. Unease 14/18 0/18 1/18 3/18
5. Nervous 11/18 0/18 4/18 3/18
6. Fear 0/18 13/18 5/18 0/18
7. Panic 0/18 17/18 1/18 0/18
8. Fright 0/18 17/18 1/18 0/18
9. Horror 0/18 16/18 2/18 0/18
10. Terror 0/18 16/18 2/18 0/18
Qall (df  9) 101.2 125.9
Qanx (df  4) 2.1 16.0
Qfear (df  4) n/c 10.8
Note. N  18. Cochrane’s Q tests the variation in binary match/no match to specific faces across levels of the
emotion label as a repeated-measures factor. Qall comparisons across Labels 1–10; Qanx comparisons across
Anxiety Labels 1–5; Qfear  comparisons across Fear Labels 6–10. Q is distributed as chi-square with df as
shown. n/c  Q not computed as there was no variation in anxiety matches across the fear labels.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .0001.
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there was also significant variation among the labels in this anal-
ysis (Q 16.0; df 4; p .003). This effect occurred because the
anxious label was matched to the fear face occasionally (by 4/18
participants), whereas none of the other labels ever was (matched
by 0/18 participants in every case).
To illustrate the above statistical results graphically, we per-
formed a multidimensional scaling with PROXSCAL, in SPSS
Version 18, using the profiles of frequencies of the nine faces (plus
the no-match category), chosen as matches to the 10 labels (fear
and its four synonyms plus anxiety and its four synonyms). The
chi-square dissimilarity metric was used to compute the dissimi-
larities between profiles for pairs of labels, showing separation
between anxiety and fear labels but generally greater dispersion for
the anxiety labels than the fear labels (Figure 3).
Finally, to go beyond the formal constraints of the OED syn-
onyms for anxiety and fear, we plotted the frequency of matches of
all emotion labels that were matched to the putative facial images
for environmental scanning and fear during Experiment 2, again
obtaining a pattern of findings consistent with the risk assessment
explanation for anxiety (Figure 4). This plot further supports the
risk assessment explanation for anxiety by showing that labels that
are outside the list of OED synonyms for anxiety but that plausibly
describe risk assessment were preferentially matched to the facial
expression for environmental scanning. For example, suspicion
was matched to the facial expression for environmental scanning
by 16 of the 18 participants but was not matched to the facial
expression for fear by any of the participants. Similarly, the labels
apprehension and wary were matched to the facial image for
environmental scanning by 15 of the 18 participants but were not
matched to the facial expression for fear on any occasion.
Discussion
Results of Experiment 2 suggest that facially displayed risk
assessment behavior signals anxiety in humans, as this expression
was preferentially matched with the label of anxiety and its OED
synonyms, but not with fear or its OED synonyms. These results
show our participants interpreted the facial expression for envi-
ronmental scanning in a way that is emotionally congruent with
rodent drug results that show risk assessment behavior is related to
anxiety (D. C. Blanchard et al., 1990). As our participants were not
told of this rodent-based hypothesis beforehand, we argue that our
result is unlikely to be an interpretative inference and instead
represents a scientifically meaningful emotion–expression associ-
ation between risk assessment behavior and anxiety in humans.
Moreover, the tendency of participants preferentially to associate
the environmental-scanning facial expression with OED synonyms
of anxiety, such as worry or concern, but not with fear or its OED
synonyms suggests that this association is not a semantic quirk
peculiar to the word anxiety but instead represents a general
property of words that plausibly describe the feelings that accom-
pany the cautious, risk-assessing behavior elicited by ambiguously
threatening situations but not by clear threats.
It is interesting that the two central verbal labels (anxiety and
fear) were the most atypical of the two sets of labels, in terms of
their matching to the faces: the anxiety label was occasionally
Figure 3. A multidimensional scaling plot in two dimensions representing the dissimilarities between the
profiles of face matching choices for the emotion labels to which faces were matched. Each point corresponds
to one of the five anxiety or five fear synonyms in the Oxford English Dictionary. The more separated the points
the more dissimilar are the profiles of face matches made to the labels concerned. Horror and terror as well as
fright and panic are located at the same points.
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cross-matched to fear face, whereas the other anxiety-synonym
labels never were; the fear label was matched to the fear face less
often than the other four fear labels were, although the nonmatches
for all fear labels were never to the anxious face. This might
suggest that the anxious face we used was better described as
reflecting unease, concern, worry, or nervousness rather than the
general label of anxiety; conversely the fear face appeared to be
better described by verbal labels suggesting extreme fear (horror,
terror, panic, or fright) rather than fear more generally. This might
suggest that further work is needed to check whether a less
extreme fear facial expression would be as well separated from the
environmental-scanning face as the present, more intense fear face
appears to be.
General Discussion
We found that scenarios describing ambiguous threat were
preferentially matched to still and video images of a facial expres-
sion that had been previously posed in response to a scenario
describing ambiguous threat. This facial expression contained two
behaviors (eye darts and head swivels) that plausibly increase the
area of the vicinity covered by the eyes and thus perform an
environmental-scanning function. Since this facial expression was
also preferentially labeled in Experiment 2 by naı¨ve observers as
signaling anxiety and not fear or any other major emotion, the
implications of our results are threefold. First, they are congruent
with findings in rodents suggesting that anxiety is explicable as an
adaptive risk assessment reaction to ambiguous threat (D. C.
Blanchard et al., 1991). Second, they suggest anxiety and fear are
separable emotions in humans, in line with findings obtained using
personality questionnaires (Perkins et al., 2007) and in contrast to
circumplex accounts of human emotion (e.g., Posner, Russell, &
Peterson, 2005). Third, since we used a facial expression paradigm
to study risk assessment behavior, our results may also provide a
facial expression for anxiety that should be added to the generally
accepted facial expression repertoire, as well as offering some
insights concerning the production of facial expressions of emo-
tion.
Evolutionary Implications
Our discovery that apparent environmental-scanning behavior
displayed facially in response to ambiguous threat signals anxiety
to conspecifics fits Darwin’s (1872) theory that some facial ex-
pressions of emotion evolved from functional movements. This
theory has previously been supported by the finding that the facial
expressions for fear and disgust are not only social signals of affect
but also have functional value, as a means of increasing and
decreasing sensory input, respectively (Susskind et al., 2008). Not
all facial expressions of emotion have plausible functional signif-
icance, but the anxious facial expression we have identified seems
to fit this latter category as, in line with rodent data (D. C.
Blanchard & Blanchard, 2008), it was preferentially matched to
ambiguous threat by naı¨ve observers and has an eye-darting,
head-swiveling element that is likely to aid the localization of an
ambiguous threat. Thus, it seems fair to propose that the
environmental-scanning facial movements initially evolved by nat-
ural selection as a means of aiding the investigation of ambiguous
Figure 4. The frequency of matches of all emotion labels to the putative facial images for environmental
scanning and fear during Experiment 2.
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threat and only secondarily acquired meaning as a social signal of
anxiety. In contrast, it is credible that the intensely focused, non-
swiveling, fixed-gaze facial expression for fear might have origi-
nated as a means of accelerating production of an appropriate
defensive response to a threat once it has been localized.
Should these two hypotheses turn out to be supported experi-
mentally, the anxious and fearful facial expressions may ultimately
be accepted as mutually supporting components of an evolved
behavior pattern that equips individuals to adapt to the differing
intelligence-gathering demands of different but often rapidly in-
terchanging threat contexts, namely, ambiguous threat and clear
threat, respectively. Moreover, our finding that human observers
appear to be sensitive to the differing functional significance of
these two facial expressions implies that there may also be survival
value in the ability to glean, silently and rapidly, indirect informa-
tion regarding the type of threat present, merely by observing the
facial expressions of conspecifics. More generally, this idea is in
line with recent ethological findings that seagulls monitor the
vigilance behavior of other gulls in their group to decide whether
to sleep, implying that vigilance in general has a social element
and indicating that adaptive behavior at the level of an individual
can lead to collective vigilance/relaxation reactions, such as panic
in a herd or waves of sleep (Beauchamp, 2011).
Implications for Research on Facial Expressions of
Emotion
A distinct facial expression for anxiety does not feature in the
most widely accepted list of basic facial expressions of emotion
(namely, happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise;
Ekman, 1999), yet our participants readily associated a facial
expression portraying rodent-style environmental scanning with
anxiety as opposed to fear or any other major emotion. This may
be explained by the historical tendency among scientists to view
anxiety and fear as interchangeable emotions (Geer, 1965), leading
previous generations of facial expression researchers to assume
that the classical facial expression for fear also represented anxi-
ety. It is interesting to note that Charles Darwin was not one of
these: he distinguished anxiety from fear using a rationale that
prefigures the rodent findings on threat ambiguity and emotion, as
he associated anxiety with the expectation of suffering and fear
with actual danger (Darwin, 1872).
Findings in the Context of Neuroscience and Rodent
Models
More generally, results may also allay the concern that human
psychological processes are too complex to be explained by rodent
models (Matthews, 2008), as our human findings can be aligned
post hoc with two prominent neuroscientific models of anxiety and
fear that are based primarily on rodent data. The threat imminence
continuum theory (Fanselow & Lester, 1988) associates initial
detection of a remote threat (the postencounter) with anticipatory
anxiety mediated chiefly by forebrain regions (Bouton, Mineka, &
Barlow, 2001) but aligns situations that are imminently dangerous
(the circa strike) with fear and active escape efforts controlled by
midbrain areas (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Conversely, the defen-
sive direction principle in revised reinforcement sensitivity theory
(RST) portrays anxiety as elicited by threats that require approach
(i.e., create a goal conflict) and fear by threats that need not be
approached (Corr, 2008; McNaughton & Corr, 2004) with these
reactions being mediated chiefly by septohippocampal and dorsal
periaqueductal gray activity, respectively.
Both these theories are congruent with our finding that anxiety
and fear are associated with ambiguous and clear threat scenarios,
respectively. This impression is reinforced when scenario content
is considered in detail: scenarios preferentially associated with the
risk assessment facial expression, labeled as representing anxiety,
described potentially threatening situations such as “You can smell
smoke in your house but aren’t sure where it is coming from.” This
scenario has a plausible post hoc fit to the anxiety-related posten-
counter in the threat imminence continuum theory because the
threat has been detected but is not imminently dangerous. In terms
of the defensive direction theory, it should also elicit anxiety
because unexpected smoke in one’s residence will usually demand
investigation to verify its dangerousness, generating an anxiety-
related approach–avoidance goal conflict. In contrast, the scenar-
ios that were preferentially associated with the facial expression
for fear all described imminently dangerous situations such as
“You are crossing a road; your mind is somewhere else when you
suddenly hear a motor being revved very powerfully. You look
round and see that a speeding car is about to hit you.” This scenario
has a plausible fit with the fear-related circa strike in the threat
imminence continuum theory as it contains a clear threat (the car)
that is about to contact the body with likely lethal force (the car is
described as speeding). It can also be aligned with a fear-related
simple avoidance situation in the defensive direction theory be-
cause the scenario does not contain a requirement to approach the
car.
These theories have both been supported in humans by studies
using simple computer simulations of defensive situations (Mobbs
et al., 2007, 2009; Perkins et al., 2009): by describing naturalistic
behavioral results that are broadly congruent with both theories,
the present experiment might ultimately pave the way for research
comparing their relative predictive capacity with regard to brain
activation and facial expression production. For example, should a
means be found to videorecord the facial expressions of partici-
pants who are undergoing fMRI (an anxiety-inducing process for
the uninitiated), competing predictions could be tested. If the threat
imminence continuum theory is correct, forebrain regions will
increase their activation as the anxious facial expression is pro-
duced, whereas if the defensive direction principle is valid, the
facial expression for anxiety will be accompanied chiefly by
increased septohippocampal activation.
Implications for Social Relations
Although humans, like rodents, are under evolutionary pressure
to avoid basic threats such as predators, the special importance in
human life of social cohesion means we face an additional layer of
more subtle but arguably equally important evolutionary pressure,
to avoid threats to our social status or standing. For example, it is
plausible that ancestral humans who were disliked by their peers
might have been denied resources in times of hardship or even
been ostracized from the social group, with likely dire conse-
quences for their survival. Conversely, humans with a particularly
poor ability to detect signs of deception in others might be at
greater than average risk of being cheated out of valuable re-
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sources. Since it is plausible that social threats tend to be more
ambiguous and subtle than clear threats such as predators, our
finding that a distinct facial expression for anxiety that is
elicited by ambiguous threat may have special relevance for
psychologists specifically interested in the dynamics of social
interactions.
These considerations make it seem likely that anxiety, but not
fear, would be especially common when attempting to deceive in
a social context, such as when bluffing or lying, with the result that
individuals who can conceal anxiety in social settings may gain
some kind of tactical advantage. However, by the same logic, it is
equally plausible that the ability to detect anxiety in humans would
be tactically advantageous (e.g., by being able to detect anxiety
caused by lying). Viewed together, it seems probable that a situ-
ation has developed where facial signs of anxiety have evolved to
be more subtle than those of other less tactically relevant emotions,
but the capacity of humans to recognize them has evolved to keep
pace, hence the ease with which our participants were able to
recognize facial signs of anxiety. Similar arguments have already
been advanced for the general co-evolution of deception and
detection of deception (Trivers, 2011), and the existence of a facial
expression arms-race involving anxiety is congruent with anec-
dotal accounts of shoplifters drinking modest amounts of alcohol
before a crime spree to relax their faces, in an attempt to prevent
their criminal intent being communicated to store detectives via an
anxious, “shifty” facial expression. Similarly, the impassive
“poker face” practiced by card players would also appear to have
specific tactical value as a means of reducing facial signs of
anxiety that would otherwise impede their ability to bluff, having
been dealt a poor hand of cards.
Implications for Theoretical Models of Emotion
In a more general social psychology context, our results appear
to be at odds with circumplex theories that attempt to explain all
human emotions as cognitive interpretations of neural sensations
arising from two fundamental dimensions, namely, valence and
arousal (see Figure 5; Russell, 1980). Since some circumplex
theorists locate anxiety and fear in the same, high-arousal
negative-valence quadrant of the emotional factor space (e.g.,
Posner et al., 2005), these models imply they are rather similar
phenomena; yet according to our data, anxiety and fear have
different facial expressions, different eliciting stimuli, and differ-
ent functional associations.
Our findings appear more compatible with a motivation-
direction framework within social psychology that distinguishes
between emotions using their motivational direction. For example,
E. Harmon-Jones and Allen (1998) found anger was associated
with electroencephalographic asymmetry consistent with approach
motivation despite its negative affective valence. Further results
congruent with this finding have been obtained using other meth-
odologies, such as affective modulation of the startle eye blink
(Amodio & Harmon-Jones, 2011) and a facial expression para-
digm (C. Harmon-Jones et al., 2011).
The split between anxiety and fear that we have identified can
therefore potentially be integrated with motivation-direction mod-
els because although anxiety and fear may appear similar in
valence and arousal (both being negative and arousing), they are
opposite in motivational direction: we found the putative anxious
face was associated with ambiguously threatening situations that
require approach to threat whereas the putative fear face was
associated with clearly threatening scenarios that require avoid-
Figure 5. Example of self -report emotion data conforming to a circumplex model of emotion. From “A
Circumplex Model of Affect” by J. A. Russell, 1980, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, p. 1168.
Copyright 1980 by American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
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ance. Ultimately, by including motivational direction in cognitive
accounts of emotion, it may be feasible to find common ground
between such models and rodent-based models of discrete emo-
tions with discrete neural substrates.
A well-known example of the latter type of model is the RST of
personality (Corr, 2008; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton
& Corr, 2004) that attempts to use rodent learning research to
explain human personality, postulating that individual differences
in reactivity to different classes of reinforcing stimuli underlie
important human personality dimensions, such as neuroticism and
extraversion. RST portrays anxiety and fear as both being negative
emotions, yet associates them with eliciting stimuli of opposite
motivational directions: anxiety with threats that require approach
(i.e., that present a goal conflict) and threats that may be simply
avoided (that present no goal conflict; McNaughton & Corr, 2004).
In the light of work over the last decade or so suggesting that some
emotions may be negative in valence yet approach-based (e.g.,
Amodio & Harmon-Jones, 2011; E. Harmon-Jones & Allen,
1998), it is possible therefore to reconcile these two scientific
endeavors by viewing anxiety as a second candidate, along with
anger, for an approach-based but negatively valenced emotion.
Limitations and Future Directions
This latter consideration points to a conceptual limitation of our
work in that functional theories of emotion such as RST tend to
concern distinctions between anxiety and fear in behavior and
experience, but this research focused only on the reading of emo-
tional expressions. Neither the actors nor observers in our research
were induced to feel the relevant emotions. An interesting future
step would therefore be to examine whether the differences in
facial expressions are also represented in emotional experiences or
behaviors. This strategy would be especially informative with
regard to the facial expression for fear as the strong theoretical
association between fear and simple avoidance behavior means
that the fear face should be a precursor to an avoidance response
such as fighting, fleeing, or freezing. In contrast the facial config-
uration seen in Image 1 of Figure 1 not only represents the putative
facial expression for anxiety but also contains the concomitant
physical defensive response, namely, environmental scanning.
Methodological limitations of our work include the use of a
facial expression paradigm to study defensive reactions, placing an
exaggerated focus on risk assessment movements that involve the
head, when rodent studies not only associate risk assessment
anxiety with head-based environmental scanning behavior but also
with whole-body movements such as approach-withdrawal oscil-
lation (Griebel, Blanchard, Jung, et al., 1995). The measurement of
naturalistic whole-body human defensive reactions under ethical
laboratory conditions was beyond the means of the present project.
However, some headway is beginning to be made in this area, with
innovative findings revealing that threatening stimuli (images of
angry faces) reduce body sway, supporting the presence of a freeze
response to threat in humans (Roelofs, Hagenaars, & Stins, 2010).
Ultimately, it may be feasible to develop a virtual reality-based
experimental technique for studying human defense that combines
the naturalism of a facial expression study with the capacity of a
maze or runway task to measure gross defensive movements. Such
a technique would allow detailed measurements of the entire
human defensive repertoire in a single experimental design.
Other practical limitations of our research include the use of one
facial expression image per emotion. For example, it is perhaps
possible that the facial image for environmental scanning (Image
1, Figure 1) may have conveyed anxiety because of the physical
appearance of the individual who posed it rather her facial expres-
sion per se. These criticisms may be countered by the finding that
the success at matching faces to emotive stimuli was almost
completely uniform across facial images, with only the facial
image for happiness being matched to its respective stimuli with
significantly greater success than the other facial images (Figure
2). Additionally, the configuration of our putative facial expression
for anxiety shown in Image 1 (Figure 1 and Movie 1, which can be
downloaded at https://sites.google.com/site/adamperkinsphd) is,
by any reasonable analysis, a credible human analogue of the
environmental-scanning behavior that is innately elicited from
rodents by ambiguous threat and is modulated by anti-anxiety
drugs. Nevertheless, the topic could be explored in more detail in
future research by filming multiple individuals displaying
environmental-scanning behavior and attempting to test statisti-
cally whether factors such as hairstyle, head shape, and gender
affect the reliability of portrayal.
Other interesting future studies that could be derived from the
present research include exploring the effects of gaze direction on
facial expression recognition, since facial expression type has been
found to interact with gaze direction in determining amygdala
response with regard to anger and fear faces (Adams, Gordon,
Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003). Other future experiments might
assess behavioral inhibition, which has long been associated with
anxiety in rodent studies (Gray, 1982); therefore, one option for
future research on this topic would be to make electromyographic
recordings of facial muscle activity in an individual attempting to
pose a facial expression for risk assessment: if such a facial
expression represents anxiety, it should be associated with rela-
tively inhibited activity in the facial muscles compared with the
facial expression for fear. This latter prediction has preliminary (if
circumstantial) support from the finding that socially anxious
children generally show reduced facial activity and are less able to
pose recognizable facial expressions of emotion than average
children (Melfsen, Osterlow, & Florin, 2000).
Implications for Psychopathology
This finding that children who are prone to anxiety show a
different pattern of facial activity than average nonanxious chil-
dren in turn suggests that future research on the causes of emo-
tional expression in general might benefit from investigation into
whether individual differences in affective personality traits pre-
dict individual differences in the propensity to display particular
facial expressions of emotion. In this vein, revised RST research-
ers (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) have used findings on rodent
defense to make predictions concerning human personality, pos-
tulating in particular that trait individual differences in proneness
to simple avoidance/fear and risk assessment/anxiety may consti-
tute separable personality traits. Applied to facial expressions of
emotion, this theory arguably predicts that individuals with a trait
tendency to experience fear or anxiety should also be more prone
to displaying the respective facial expressions for these emotions.
It has been suggested that generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is
caused by alterations in the functioning of brain systems that
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govern risk assessment (D. C. Blanchard et al., 2003); this sug-
gestion stems from the capacity of drugs with clinical effectiveness
against GAD preferentially to alter rodent risk assessment behav-
ior (D. C. Blanchard et al., 1990). By linking anxiety to risk
assessment, our results support the GAD–risk assessment hypoth-
esis, implying that normal anxiety has risk assessment value but
when the risk assessment process is exaggerated, it might render
individuals so cautious that they cannot conduct a normal daily
life. The GAD–risk assessment hypothesis is already supported
post hoc by a variety of observations, such as the tendency for
individuals with GAD to display symptoms of hypervigilance
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the capacity of the
anxiety-causing drug yohimbine to induce a tense and anxious
facial expression (Holmberg & Gershon, 1961), and the presence
of an anxious, roving gaze as an observed symptom of anxiety in
the Rating Scales for Affective Symptoms (Silfverskiöld, Rose´n,
Risberg, & Gustafson, 1987). Combining these findings with the
present work, a valuable future experiment might be to determine
if patients with GAD are more likely to display the environmental-
scanning facial expression that we have identified in a wider range
of contexts and at a lower level of threat than average individuals
and then cease to display this expression when treated with anxi-
olytic drugs.
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Appendix
Emotive Scenarios Used in Study 1
Scenario Putative emotion
1: You are reminiscing with your friends about the holiday of a lifetime that you all had last year. Happiness
2: You are hill walking and come across a dead, rotting sheep on the pathway; it is surrounded by
flies and covered in maggots. Disgust
3: You are crossing a road; your mind is somewhere else when you suddenly hear a motor being
revved very powerfully. You look round and see that a speeding car is about to hit you. Fear
4: You think something good may be about to happen. Interest
5: You fail an exam. Sadness
6: You are having a heated dispute with someone. Anger
7: You are sleeping in bed during the night but wake up thinking you have heard a suspicious
noise. You get up to check it out. Anxiety
8: You are sitting quietly in your bedroom reading a book when suddenly a book falls off the
bookshelf above your head and lands with a thump on the desk in front of you. Surprise
9: You are walking your dog in the park. A young boy repeatedly kicks your dog really hard for
no reason. Anger
10: You are having a great time with your friends. Happiness
11: You are walking across a field in the country when suddenly there is the noise of galloping
hooves; you look over your shoulder and see that a large bull is charging straight toward you
at top speed. Fear
12: Alone at home one night, you have settled down to read a book when you hear the front door
opening and footsteps in the hallway. You don’t know who it could be as your housemate is
away and not due back for several days. Anxiety
13: You can smell smoke in your house but aren’t sure where it is coming from. Anxiety
14: You are walking alone in an isolated but familiar area when a menacing stranger suddenly
jumps out of the bushes with a knife to attack you. Fear
15: You are watching your favorite comedy show. Happiness
16: Even though you told him not to, your sibling borrowed your new laptop and then carelessly
spills a cup of coffee on the keyboard. Anger
17: You are hurrying along a corridor, and as you turn the corner, you nearly bump into someone
coming the other way. Surprise
18: You go to visit an elderly relative who lives on her own in an isolated house. When you get to
her front door, you find that it is ajar; as you push the door fully open to enter the house, you
call out her name, but there is no reply. Anxiety
19: You have just bought a brand new car. You park it in a side street and run an errand. When
you return to your car 5 min later, you find a couple of young boys about 9 or 10 years old
spray painting obscenities on the side of your car. Anger
20: A good friend of yours has moved away to the other side of the world, and you may never see
him or her again. Sadness
21: You encounter someone whom you find attractive. Interest
22: You are sitting in a room in a tall building, and you look out of the window to see a plane
flying toward you, about to crash straight into where you are sitting. Fear
23: You open a can of tuna, and it is full of worms. Disgust
24: A friend tells you a good joke. Happiness
Note. Scenarios were presented in series via a computer slideshow. Threat scenarios were modeled after those in the
Blanchard Threat Scenario Questionnaire used in initial attempts to study human defense (D. C. Blanchard et al., 2001).
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